Shariatmadari as a Symbol of Political Favoritism in the Pezeshkian Administration; Why Should the CEO of Persian Gulf Holding Be Dismissed?

The end of the confrontation between Mohsen Paknejad and Mohammad Shariatmadari left a damaging image of power relations in the fourteenth government: a minister who had acted to change the management of the Persian Gulf Holding left the government, while the manager who was the subject of this change remained in his position. 

Paknejad's resignation was accepted, and Hamid Bord took over as acting Minister of Oil. The Presidential Office cited personal issues as the reason for this departure; however, this explanation does not eliminate questions about the political outcome of the conflict that was ongoing before the minister's exit.

In the published accounts of this dispute, the Ministry of Oil's efforts to change the management of the holding faced resistance, and intervention by the Presidential Office halted the changes. Now, regardless of the official reason for the resignation, the outcome of this struggle is clear to the public: Paknejad could not advance his desired change, but Shariatmadari managed to maintain his position. This result raises a question beyond the fate of the two managers: in the Pezeshkian administration, does authority come from legal responsibility or from access to the head of government?

The End of Arm Wrestling in Energy Management

If the narrative of Shariatmadari's political relationships playing a role in Paknejad's departure is taken as a basis, we are faced with a dangerous inversion of management relations. A manager at the level of an economic enterprise can stand against a minister, halt his decision, and ultimately remain in a situation where the minister has left the scene. 

In such a situation, the title of ministry retains the responsibility for accountability, but loses the necessary authority to enforce it. The minister must answer for the performance of a sector where even the change of management of its most important entities depends on the approval of political circles.

 The shareholding structure of the holding and the powers of the board of directors must be respected; however, these same rules must be clear, stable, and independent of personal relationships. One cannot hold the Ministry of Oil accountable when demanding accountability and keep the minister outside the decision-making process. A government that does not define the boundaries of its institutions' authority turns managerial disagreements into a competition for influence. In this competition, a manager's track record will matter less than his ability to find a powerful patron.

Collapsed Hierarchy in Government

The message of this situation to the executive body of the government is devastating. From tomorrow, a director-general or mid-level manager might conclude that to keep their seat, they need more than just executing legal orders and improving performance; they need connections with higher circles. When bypassing a superior manager is rewarded, the motivation to adhere to administrative hierarchy diminishes. Lobbying replaces evaluation, and granting favors to intermediaries of influence can become a tool to secure managerial positions.

Especially since just a few days before this dismissal, Shariatmadari, without having a related position, appeared among the welcomers of Pezeshkian upon his return from New York to send a clear message to his critics that his relationship with the head of the fourteenth government holds power beyond his current position.

 Critics remind us that when the hierarchy in the country's governance structure is breached, favoritism grows in these gaps. Appointments, contracts, board memberships, and access to economic resources have the potential to become tools for garnering political support. In such conditions, the executive apparatus turns into a collection of personal domains where managers compete to retain their patrons instead of coordinating. The result is contradictory decisions, stalled projects, illogical changes, and the erosion of trust among employees and investors. The cost of this disorder is not paid from the pockets of those with influence; it is imposed on production, public income, and people's livelihoods.

President or Executor of Corrupt Circles' Orders

Pezeshkian now faces a test regarding the credibility of his presidency. From the perspective of restoring managerial authority, immediate action to dismiss Shariatmadari, while adhering to the company's legal mechanisms, is the clearest way to repair this damaging message. This action, along with a transparent explanation of Paknejad's departure, could demonstrate that the president did not prioritize retaining a manager over the credibility of the executive structure and that the decision to change the minister, as some narratives suggest, was not the result of the opposing side's victory in a political conflict.

 Retaining Shariatmadari without a clear response strengthens the criticism that was directed at the fourteenth government from the start: that forces close to former presidents and influential political and economic circles shape government decisions beyond their official responsibilities. The claim of government administration by networks of corruption and favoritism is not proven by a single change; however, such an outcome is sufficient for it to be believable if the president cannot demonstrate the independence of his decision.

 Pezeshkian cannot speak of government cohesion while allowing the outcome of a managerial dispute to discredit the ministerial position. The minister has left; now the issue is the responsibility that remains on the president's shoulders. If he does not repair this breach of authority, Shariatmadari's continued presence in the public mind will become the government's tacit admission of its inability to control circles of influence.