23 Years of Uncertainty for Gachsaran Machinery Manufacturing, Documents Testifying Against Tajgardoon's Narrative

Gholamreza Tajgardoon has recently released documents from the year 2003 regarding the establishment of the Gachsaran Machinery Manufacturing factory and speaks of his role in pursuing this project; documents that apparently aim to showcase part of his record in the industrial development of Gachsaran. However, a close reading of these letters, alongside the fate of the factory, presents a different picture: a project that more than two decades ago had allocated funds, land, bank facilities, and even private sector participation, is still a subject of "revival" and "transfer". Tajgardoon himself now speaks of the "years of uncertainty" of this complex.

 The most important published document is the memorandum dated November 27, 2003 between officials of the Management and Planning Organization and the Organization for Development and Renovation of Iranian Industries. The subject of the memorandum is clear: "Establishing a unit for manufacturing oil, gas, and petrochemical equipment in Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province".

A Plan Without Vision and Financial Ambiguity

 This memorandum shows that the project lacked both a plan and a clear financial path from the start. In the first clause, 15 billion rials for the current year and 15 billion rials for the year 2004 were allocated for infrastructure. Even Tajgardoon's name is mentioned in this clause: the funds should be communicated by "Mr. Tajgardoon, the esteemed Deputy of Regional and Parliamentary Affairs of the Management Organization".

The second clause asks provincial officials to deliver the project land so that operations can "immediately" commence. In the third clause, the Management Organization and provincial officials commit to securing bank facilities up to 90 percent of the required project investment.

However, perhaps the most crucial part for understanding today's situation is the fourth clause: the Development Organization and provincial officials were tasked from the year 2003 to seek qualified private sector partners for investment participation.

Fabricated Achievements from a 23-Year-Old Project

So the question is clear: when 23 years ago, funds, land, bank facilities, and even private sector participation were included in the project's roadmap, why is the factory's rescue today again tied to finding a private investor?

Two other published letters add to the importance of this question. Correspondence from the Management and Planning Organization shows that the issue had moved beyond a local proposal and entered the formal administrative process, budget allocation, and project implementation follow-up. In one of the correspondences, the figure of 15 billion rials is mentioned again, and multiple administrative references on the letters indicate that the file was circulating at various managerial levels. 

Therefore, these documents are more a record of the "start of a project" than of "building a factory," for which answers about the outcome must be provided.

Exit from Production Circuit After Three Years

The subsequent fate of the factory is also noteworthy. An IRNA report states that the factory entered the production circuit in 2009, exited production in 2012, and resumed operations in 2013; however, accumulated debt, lack of market, and legal issues once again led to its closure. The same report states that the factory once operated at only about 10 to 15 percent capacity, and despite having the potential to employ about 500 people, only about 80 people were directly and indirectly employed there.

 The story didn't end there. In 2021, officials once again spoke of "reviving" the factory. Another report states that 500 billion rials were approved for the factory's infrastructure, but the factory manager announced that this approval had not been implemented; landscaping was also still incomplete. In 2023, the factory returned to the production circuit once again after five years of closure.

Tajgardoon's Effort to Share in Success and Conceal Project Failure

This history turns the publication of the 2003 letters into a political and managerial question. Tajgardoon cannot only present the first page of this file as his record and ignore the subsequent pages. If being present at the start of the project indicates his political and managerial role, the public has the right to ask what the result of this influence and pursuit has been over the following two decades?

 Of course, the responsibility for the factory's fate is not limited to one person. Governments, IDRO, Social Security, and provincial managers have all had responsibilities at various times. However, Tajgardoon himself has brought these documents into the public eye to highlight his historical role; therefore, examining that role is also inevitable.

The main contradiction is here: in 2003, it was supposed to deliver the land, start operations immediately, provide financial resources, and bring in a private investor; in 2026, there is still talk of transferring the factory to a private investor to end the "years of uncertainty".

 The documents Tajgardoon has released, therefore, are not the end of the discussion; they are the beginning of a demand: if this project had such political and financial backing 23 years ago, who should be held accountable for the gap between all those memorandums, funds, and promises and the current state of Gachsaran Machinery Manufacturing? More importantly, what response does Tajgardoon, who today highlights his role in the birth of this project, have regarding its fate?