The chairmanship of the Energy Commission is not a license to rule over the oil and petrochemical industry. A parliament representative is elected to oversee the minister's performance and defend public interests; not to allocate managerial seats and contracts to close associates.
This issue does not align at all with the record of interventions by Ali Mousa Ahmadi, the commission's chairman, in recent months. Ahmadi, without possessing relevant qualifications or experience in the energy industry, has taken on the role of broker, extortionist, and contract intermediary, seeking a share of large petrochemical company contracts.
Ahmadi's long presence in the Energy Commission should be measured by a specialized track record, oversight achievements, and tangible results for the industry. There should also be transparency regarding the compatibility of his education and professional background with this responsibility. Simply sitting repeatedly on the commission's chair does not bring expertise; just as access to the minister and CEO is not a certificate of competence. The weight of a commission chairman should be measured by the quality of his oversight, not the number of managers who must satisfy him to maintain their positions..
Dispute with Meydari under the Pretext of Applying Pressure for a Greater Share
Ahmadi's dispute with Ahmad Meydari and the use of the impeachment atmosphere are linked to efforts to maintain managers he supports. The name of Majid Khodabakhsh and his continued presence as chairman of the board of Jam Petrochemical is one of the points of this criticism. References have also been made to rulings and correspondence attributed to the Supreme Court and the Inspection Organization regarding his retirement. The text and scope of these decisions should be published to clarify the responsibility for his continued presence..
If there is a legal obstacle to Khodabakhsh's continued responsibility, no parliamentary support should nullify it. The petrochemical company is not a backyard for political relations where the implementation of regulations depends on the satisfaction of a representative. The Minister of Welfare must also answer for the basis of his decision; whether it is to retain or dismiss the manager. The law should not be left waiting outside the negotiation room, and the fate of a company's management should not be determined by a balance of pressure..
The issue raised by informed sources is not limited to one manager. Ahmadi's activities have repeatedly included correspondence with the Persian Gulf Holding and Asaluyeh Petrochemical Companies for the employment of recommended individuals and support for specific contractors. Over the years, the Energy Commission chairman has consistently requested board seats and the appointment of individuals associated with him in the management structure of petrochemical companies to secure a specific share of contracting contracts.
When a parliament representative and the Energy Commission chairman's recommendation turns into pressure for employment or contract allocation, it is no longer about pursuing public affairs; it is about imposing the cost of political relations on the resources of a company that must be accountable to its employees and shareholders..
The Club of Qualification Approval over Oil Ministry Candidates
Impeachment should not become a club for bargaining over appointments. The minister must explain his performance, not for rejecting a list of recommendations. Whenever parliamentary support or opposition is tied to retaining a manager, changing an appointment, or selecting a contractor, oversight loses its meaning. In such a situation, the intensity of speeches and the abundance of warnings cannot turn a power deal into a defense of public interests..
Accordingly, pressure on potential oil ministry candidates and conditioning support on gaining a share in future management is Mousa Ahmadi's recent approach, seen alongside extortion and collusion with Hamid Board, the current acting oil minister, in joint meetings with names proposed for this ministry.
This pattern is also attributed to the era of Paknejad's ministry. Analysts remind that no ministry candidate or manager should exchange commitment to the industry's interests for commitment to the demands of a commission chairman..
Mousa Ahmadi must be aware that the people of his constituency need public services, sustainable employment, reduced pollution, and a fair share of energy wealth. Defending these demands is not the same as interfering in the details of company administration. Pursuing the people's rights does not grant permission to appoint contractors and impose managers. Asaluyeh, under the burden of industrial, environmental, and social problems, needs accountable management.
Managers must also be accountable for their decisions and not be able to hide behind the support of representatives. Reducing the chairmanship of the commission to brokerage for seats and contracts harms both the industry and erodes the parliament's credibility. Ahmadi's response must be clear: publishing correspondence, explaining managerial support, and defining the boundary between oversight and interference. Oversight power is not the personal property of any representative..
