Rashidi, Mokhtar, and Taheri; The Triangle Leading the Fuel Smuggling Network and Corruption in Abadan's Organizational Housing Allocation

New information from Feydus about the management relations at the Abadan refinery suggests a series of allegations about fuel diversion, contract allocations to close associates, cost inflation in organizational housing repairs, and granting privileges to maintain managerial positions.

 Informed sources have stated that Rashidi, the CEO of the refinery, Mohammad Taheri, a board member, some Abadan distribution officials, and Jalil Mokhtar have taken charge of leading this network in collaboration with each other.

 According to the received information, the mentioned individuals, in cooperation with Ahmadzadeh, the owner of the fuel station for boats in Chouebdeh and Mokhtar's election financial supporter, have created a network to transfer fuel outside the legal route. According to documents, the stations near Arvand operate under the guise of supplying fuel to vessels, but part of their allocated fuel is diverted to smuggling routes. The amount of fuel, the period of operation, and the potential share of each individual in this mechanism can determine the level of corruption and the method of share distribution in this case among the partners involved in the violation.

Coastal Stations; Continuation of the Previous Case

Feydus previously, in a report dated December 10, 2025 , exposed the issue of Abadan's coastal fuel stations with organized smuggling coverage and the role of political support in their operations. In that report, referring to administrative correspondences, it was mentioned the construction of at least four unauthorized stations in the coastal area and the role attributed to Mohammad Bani-Saeed and Ahmadzadeh. The publication of that report, in itself, does not constitute independent confirmation of the new allegations against refinery managers..

 New information suggests a potential connection between fuel supply, political influence, and refinery management. Examining this connection requires matching station quotas with the number of vessels, delivery documents, tank capacities, and actual consumption.

Custom Contracts and Cost Inflation for Houses

Another part of the received information refers to the definition of unnecessary projects, issuance of fictitious invoices, and allocation of contracts to close associates and supporters of the relevant managers. According to obtained information, repairs of organizational houses have been one of the paths for imposing billion-dollar costs on the company; costs whose necessity, actual execution level, and their alignment with the paid amounts are subject to objection.

In this regard, the brother of Mousavi Sandroni, a refinery manager with a history of being the CEO of the Naft Abadan sports club, and one of Mokhtar's relatives are mentioned as individuals involved in the responsibility for repairs and housing projects. Using these responsibilities to approve status reports and invoices that do not match the work done indicates the organized nature of this ongoing corruption method.

 Simultaneously, it has been announced that addressing some houses is deliberately halted so that deterioration and increased maintenance costs become the basis for requesting a transfer permit from the Ministry of Oil. Conversely, according to the same information, large houses are allocated to some affiliates, and costly renovations are carried out. Examining these two trends should clarify what the criteria for allocating repair budgets were and which houses, with what resolution, were set for transfer.

Astronomical Bribes in the Form of Receiving Coins and Tether Transfers

The received information also reports that these refinery managers receive coins through intermediaries in exchange for allocating organizational housing. Another issue that needs to be specially examined by security agencies is the allocation of houses to individuals associated with security and judicial institutions, aimed at preventing the pursuit of violations.

Payments with Tether for a person with the last name Azimifar, in exchange for supporting the continuation of Rashidi and Taheri's management, show that Fardin Rashidi and board members are making serious efforts to maintain managerial positions  to continue their substantial personal gains from the prevailing corruption at the refinery.

  These documents and information once again prove how the dominance of corrupt management circles over decades has turned the Abadan refinery from a valuable entity in Iran's energy industry into a deteriorated structure with a noticeable decline in profit. To the extent that the six-month profit of the Abadan refinery has become equivalent to one-fifteenth of the Isfahan refinery.

 Managers whose rotation in various positions has brought no benefit to the hardworking workers of this refinery and has only filled the pockets of the corrupt management network over several decades.