Systematic Corruption and Widespread Poverty: The Legacy of Power Gangs for the People of Iran

Economic corruption in the Islamic Republic cannot be limited to reformists, principlists, executives, moderates, or the Stability Front. Cases from the past three decades show that wherever political power, banking resources, government currency, oil, imports, privatization, and non-transparent oversight have intersected, large rent-seeking opportunities have also been created.

 From the government of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Hassan Rouhani, Ebrahim Raisi, and now Masoud Pezeshkian, governments have changed, but the main question remains: How do limited individuals and companies gain access to resources that sometimes rival the budgets of major sectors of the country?

 This report does not exempt the hardline faction close to the Stability Front from corruption; on the contrary, cases from the Ahmadinejad and Raisi governments show that the claim of "integrity" by one faction against the corruption of another is not consistent with the reality of judicial cases.

Hashemi and Khatami; The Birth of a Private Economy in the Shadow of Power

Hashemi Rafsanjani's government entered a period with the slogan of "reconstruction," privatization, and industrial development, which created new relationships between government managers and economic activities.

One of the notable examples is Hossein Marashi and Mowli-al-Movahedin Institute. This institute, which was established with charitable and poverty alleviation goals, later became an entity associated with large economic assets; available sources speak of full ownership of Mahan Airlines and about half of Kerman Khodro. Marashi's own account of Mahan's founding also shows how connections with government officials and the use of Iran's debt settlement mechanism with Egypt played a role in the company's formation.

The question is not whether owning a company is a crime; the question is where was the boundary between political power, governmental access, and economic opportunity? In Khatami's government, the case of Shahram Jazayeri became another symbol of this entanglement. His case involved payments and connections with several power holders and representatives. Reports from that period also recorded disputes related to large contracts, project allocations, and Petropars.

Therefore, even a government that entered the field with the slogan of political reform could not create a transparent structure that separates money and politics.

Ahmadinejad and Rouhani; "Integrity" versus Billion-Dollar Cases 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came with the slogan of fighting the "mafia of wealth and power"; however, his era witnessed some of the heaviest corruption cases in the Islamic Republic. Mohammad Reza Rahimi, his first vice president, was eventually sentenced to over five years in prison, restitution of about two billion and 850 million tomans, and a one billion toman fine. Hamid Baghaei, Ahmadinejad's executive vice president, was also later convicted. During the same period, Saeed Mortazavi's name was raised in the Social Security case.

 Then the famous three-thousand-billion-toman case of Mahafarid Amir Khosravi exploded; a case that was essentially unimaginable without extensive access to the banking network. Mahmoud Reza Khavari, the then CEO of Bank Melli, was also highlighted in this incident and remained in Canada after leaving Iran.

 And then Babak Zanjani; a businessman who became a link in oil sales and the transfer of oil revenues during sanctions. Zanjani's issue was not just an oil debtor. The bigger question was what mechanism allowed billions of euros of the country's oil assets to be placed in the hands of one businessman?

 Thus, the government that came to power with the claim of fighting "big shots" faced Rahimi, Baghaei, Mahafarid, Khavari, and Zanjani. Even reports of hundreds of confirmed violations by supervisory bodies regarding Ahmadinejad's government's performance were published.  With the rise of Hassan Rouhani, the cycle did not stop.

 The cases of Bank Sarmayeh and the Teachers' Reserve Fund became one of the controversies of that period; although part of the violations under review dated back to Ahmadinejad's government years. The parliament prepared a detailed investigation report on the fund and sent the case to the judiciary.

 During these years, the issue of Ali Ansari, Bank Ayandeh, and Iran Mall also became one of the prominent examples of the concentration of banking resources. The crisis of Bank Ayandeh continued for years until it reached a final point during Pezeshkian's era.

 The case of Debsh Tea also began in 2019, during Rouhani's second government, and reached much larger dimensions in Raisi's government. Published data show that more than 60 percent of the currency in question was allocated during Raisi's government, and the rest was related to Rouhani's government.

From Raisi to Pezeshkian; "Clean-Handed Government" and a Legacy That Continues

 Ebrahim Raisi's government also introduced itself as a government fighting corruption; however, Debsh Tea became one of the largest economic cases in the Islamic Republic.

 The Debsh Group received about 3.37 billion dollars for importing tea and machinery from 2019 to 2022. According to the Inspection Organization report, 79 percent of the allocated NIMA currency for tea imports during the period under review went to this group.

The case went far beyond a private company. Its trail reached the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Industry, Mines, and Trade, banks, the Central Bank, customs, and the Standards Organization. Ultimately, Javad Sadati Nejad, the Minister of Agriculture in Raisi's government, and Reza Fatemi Amin, the Minister of Industry in the same government, were convicted, and the main defendant was sentenced to heavy imprisonment, restitution of over two billion euros, and a fine.

 The Debsh case precisely shows why reducing corruption to "a corrupt businessman" is misleading. Receiving billions of dollars in currency, importing, clearing goods, and fulfilling currency obligations is not possible without passing through several governmental bodies. Now, Masoud Pezeshkian's government has inherited this very structure.

 A clear example is Bank Ayandeh. By the end of December 2024, the bank's accumulated losses were reported to be about 425 trillion tomans. The crisis continued, and finally, in the fall of 2025, the Central Bank announced the dissolution of Bank Ayandeh; Pezeshkian's executive deputy also mentioned in 2026 that banks had taken people's money and built towers instead.

Pezeshkian himself, when announcing the removal of preferential currency in December 2025, spoke with unprecedented language about the misuse of these resources and argued that the mechanism of currency allocation to importers created grounds for corruption.  But admitting the existence of a corrupt mechanism does not replace reforming it.

 From Mowli-al-Movahedin and Shahram Jazayeri to Mahafarid, Khavari, Rahimi, Baghaei, and Zanjani; from Bank Sarmayeh and Bank Ayandeh to Debsh Tea, names and governments have changed, but one common element remains: non-transparent access to public resources and the lack of accountability of power holders.

 For this reason, corruption in Iran cannot be explained by the "Hashemi gang," "Khatami gang," "Ahmadinejad gang," or "Rouhani gang." Hardline factions and the Stability Front are also not exempt from this question.

 The real map of corruption becomes clear when, instead of the political genealogy of individuals, the path of money is followed: Who received the currency? Who gave the loan? Who delivered the oil? Who issued the permit? Who signed the contract? Which entity was supposed to oversee and why didn't it?

 Three decades of corruption cases have at least clarified one reality: changing the government alone has not eliminated the rent-seeking network. The main issue is a structure that turns political power into a gateway to wealth and public resources, and then, when a case explodes, reduces responsibility to a few limited defendants.